WHO ARE THE BRAZILIANS TOBACCO GROWERS THAT BREACH THEIR CONTRACTS WHIT THE INDUSTRY?

  • Heron Sergio Moreira Begnis Universidade de Santa Cruz do Sul - UNISC
  • Silvio Cesar Arend Universidade de Santa Cruz do Sul - UNISC
  • Rejane Maria Alievi Universidade de Santa Cruz do Sul - UNISC

Resumo

Based on the Transaction Costs and inter-organizational relations literature, this study analyzes the socioeconomic characteristics of the growers who may be related to opportunistic behavior and contract breach in the tobacco chain in South Brazil. In terms of its contractual relations, tobacco production chain is very little explored, although the contractual terms are determinants in Integrated Production Systems (IPS). The nature of this research is quantitative and the data were collected through a survey with tobacco growers from the three states of South Brazil. The analysis showed the main characteristics of the tobacco growers who are more likely to breach their contracts with integrative companies.

Keywords: Contract Breach. Integrated Production System (IPS). Opportunism. Tobacco.

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Biografia do Autor

Heron Sergio Moreira Begnis, Universidade de Santa Cruz do Sul - UNISC

Doutor em Agronegócios (CEPAN/UFRGS), Mestre em Economia Rural (IEPE/UFRGS), professor do Programa de Pós-Graduação em Administração da UNISC (PPGA/UNISC).

Silvio Cesar Arend, Universidade de Santa Cruz do Sul - UNISC

Doutor em Economia (PPGE/UFRGS), Mestre em Economia Rural (IEPE/UFRGS), professor do Programa de Pós-Graduação em Desenvolvimento Regional da UNISC (PPGDR/UNISC).

Rejane Maria Alievi, Universidade de Santa Cruz do Sul - UNISC

Doutora em Administração (PPGA/UFRGS) e Mestre em Economia (UFRGS). Professora do Programa de Pós-Graduação em Administração da Universidade de Santa Cruz do Sul (PPGA/UNISC)

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Publicado
30-03-2016
Como Citar
Moreira Begnis, H. S., Arend, S. C., & Alievi, R. M. (2016). WHO ARE THE BRAZILIANS TOBACCO GROWERS THAT BREACH THEIR CONTRACTS WHIT THE INDUSTRY?. RACE - Revista De Administração, Contabilidade E Economia, 15(1), 9-38. https://doi.org/10.18593/race.v15i1.8286